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ABSTRACT
Research in the 1970s based on observational data provided evidence consistent with
predictions from economic theory that paying unemployment insurance (UI) benefits to
involuntarily jobless workers prolongs unemployment. However, some scholars also reported
estimates that the additional time spent in subsidized job search was productive. That is, UI
receipt tended to raise reemployment wages after work search among the unemployed. A series
of field experiments in the 1980s investigated positive incentives to overcome the work
disincentive effects of UI. These were followed by experiments in the 1990s that evaluated the
effects of restrictions on UI eligibility through stronger work search requirements and alternative
uses of UI. The new century has seen some related field experiments in employment policy, and
reexamination of the earlier experimental results. This paper reviews the experimental evidence
and considers it in the context of the current federal-state UI system.
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Evaluating Public Employment Programs with Field Experiments: A Survey of American
Evidence
Policies to support labor markets in the United States are mainly initiatives of the federal
government. Historically, states and localities have been reluctant to act independently in
employment policy for fear of competitively disadvantaging resident industries with added costs.
Federal leadership has permitted individual states to address important labor market problems
with a diminished risk of job loss.

The Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 established the U.S. Employment Service (ES), the
Social Security Act of 1935 established the federal-state system of unemployment insurance
(UI), and Depression-era public works programs enacted by the Works Progress Administration
put millions of men to work. These three New Deal programs signaled the start of federal
employment policies, which have been refined over the years based on program experience in
states and local areas. Public administration relies on best practice as a guide. Modern public
management looks to program evaluation as a guide to improve policy. In the area of
employment policy, since the 1980s the states have truly served as laboratories of democracy.
States have tested promising policy improvements for employment programs by applying
classical experimental methods with randomized controlled trials on large samples of programeligible persons.

This paper summarizes the knowledge accumulated from a wide variety of field
experiments conducted on elements of U.S. employment programs over the past 40 years. To set
the context for this discussion, the next section briefly considers the advantages and
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disadvantages of the experimental approach. The following four sections provide summaries of
the research on employment programs and incentives tried by the ES-UI partnership to promote
return to work by job-ready persons with recent labor market experience: cash reemployment
bonuses, job search assistance (JSA) and the UI work test, targeted JSA, and employer
incentives. The final section offers a summary and some comments on the relevance of lessons
for the UI system today from these field experiments.

The Appeal of Field Experiments

Classically designed field experiments involving randomized controlled trials (RCT) are
the gold standard for estimating the impact of changes to public programs. If random assignment
is achieved, modeling of behavior and complex econometric methods are not needed to obtain
reliable program impact estimates.1 With large samples randomly assigned to treatment and
control groups, observable and unobservable characteristics of the two groups should not differ
on average, so any difference in outcomes can be attributed to the program change. Average
program impacts can be measured as the simple difference between the means of the samples of
program participants and of control group members on outcomes of interest. Since this process
is easy to understand, impact estimates computed in this way can be influential for public policy.

When there is nonrandom assignment to either a program participant group or the
comparison group, then proper estimation of program impacts requires statistical methods of
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Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999) enumerate the assumptions implicit in such a view of random-assignment
field experiments as a means for model-free impact estimation.
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correction to offset potential sample selection bias. A commonly used approach, which could be
called “belt and suspenders,” is to compute mean differences in regression models, including
observable characteristics to correct for sample differences.2 However, this is often not sufficient
to correct for biases due to unobservable differences between groups. A popular solution to this
problem was proposed by Heckman (1976), who asserted that sample selection could be
characterized as an unobservable variable that distinguishes program participants from
nonparticipants. Other approaches involve strategically selecting a comparison group by
matching characteristics of program participants with nonparticipants who appear to be
otherwise similar. Such matching may be done either on a set of characteristics or on a single
summary measure of several characteristics known as a propensity score (Heckman, LaLonde,
and Smith 1999). Recent research has exploited naturally occurring events that cannot be
manipulated by participants and lead to discontinuities in outcomes of interest (Lee and Lemieux
2010). These regression discontinuity methods are now regarded as second best to the gold
standard of RCT in field experiments. Because of the focus on a particular discontinuity, the
RCT methods usually estimate local average treatment effects.

Policy decisions concerning questions of whether to continue, expand, reduce, or cancel
government employment programs require information about the net benefits of government
spending. Cost-benefit analysis requires measurement of net impacts. Net impact evaluations
are not without potential problems, even if the evaluation is done under the ideal conditions of a
field experiment. The first type of potential pitfall threatens the internal validity of the
experiment. Such problems include errors in random assignment to treatment and control
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The term “belt and suspenders” refers to redundant systems that afford mutual backup in case one fails.
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groups, as well as inconsistent experimental conditions. The first of these can lead to
heterogeneity in characteristics between treatment and control groups. The second means that
the same treatment conditions were not successfully repeated in all cases. Even when
randomization is successful, problems can result from dropout bias, wherein a customer assigned
to an experimental treatment did not in fact receive the service. The logical complement to
dropout bias is called substitution bias, wherein a control group member actually receives the
treatment, although this might not be observed (Heckman et al. 2000).

The second group of evaluation pitfalls concern external validity. These issues affect the
ability to transfer impact estimates from the evaluation context to the real-world policy context.
Time horizon effects can occur when treatment subjects understand that an experimental service
is only temporary rather than permanent. Learning effects can take place within a community
during the course of an evaluation, causing later enrollees to act differently from those enrolled
around the time the experiment begins. Entry effects not observed during an evaluation can
emerge when an appealing service becomes generally available to a population of potential
customers, thereby increasing program take-up and system costs. Hawthorne effects are
responses to treatments that are not due to the content of service, but simply to special attention
being paid to participants.3 Displacement effects, which may be the most critical external
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A Hawthorne effect is the initial improvement in a process of production caused by the obtrusive observation of
that process. The effect was first noticed in the Hawthorne Works plant of the Western Electric Company in Cicero,
Illinois, during studies of workplace behavior in the 1920s and ’30s. Production increased not as a consequence of
actual changes in working conditions introduced by the plant’s management, but because management demonstrated
interest in such improvements. A reexamination of the Hawthorne data has called into question whether such an
effect actually occurred during the original studies (Jones 1992).
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validity concern, occur when treatment-assigned subjects improve their outcomes at the expense
of others in the community who are not part of the evaluation sample.4

As Zvi Griliches said, “If the data were perfect, collected from well-designed randomized
experiments, there would be hardly room for a separate field of econometrics” (Orr 1999, p.
187). The following review mentions few exceptions to the classical assumptions of
experimental design and does not delve into any corrections that might have been done before
reporting final program impact estimates. The focus here is on average program effects. That is,
it focuses on the effect of treatment upon the treated, assuming good experimental designs were
properly implemented.

Reemployment Bonuses

Economic theory suggests that paying unemployment insurance (UI) benefits to
involuntarily jobless workers prolongs unemployment. The static neoclassical theory of choice
by a consumer-worker under certainty and the dynamic theory of job search under uncertainty
both suggest that the presence of UI will lengthen unemployment durations beyond what they
would be otherwise (Cox and Oaxaca 1989; Krueger and Meyer 2002). A utility-maximizing
consumer-worker considering reemployment while receiving UI will choose to supply less labor
because the opportunity cost of leisure is lower than in the absence of UI. An unemployed job
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This discussion of impact estimation and most of the studies reviewed here focus on partial equilibrium effects of
interventions. That is, they assume away external validity issues that include general equilibrium effects such as
entry and displacement effects. Some evaluations have directly measured these effects (Davidson and Woodbury
1993).
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seeker facing uncertain draws from wage-offer distribution will have a higher reservation wage
while receiving UI than in the absence of jobless compensation.

A series of papers in the 1970s provided empirical evidence of a UI work disincentive.
Feldstein (1974) cites extremely high wage replacement rates for UI in some states, compounded
by the tax exempt status of UI payments. He argues that moral hazard from this social insurance
induced beneficiaries to exaggerate the involuntary nature of their joblessness so as to prolong
unemployment.5 Using estimating equations derived from a job search model and data from the
National Longitudinal Survey, Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) estimate that a 10 percentage point
increase in the UI wage replacement ratio would increase unemployment durations by 1.5 weeks.
They also report evidence that such an extended job search is productive, in that it increases
reemployment wages by more than 7 percent. Around the same time, Classen (1977) reports
similar empirical evidence, based on data from Arizona and Pennsylvania, that higher UI
benefits increased the duration of unemployment, but she does not find evidence of higher
reemployment wages after prolonged job search.6 However, recent research by Nekoei (2014),
using administrative data from Austria and a regression discontinuity design, estimates that a
nine-week extension of UI eligibility increases the average reemployment wage by 0.5 percent.

The payment of UI during times of involuntary unemployment is an important part of the
social safety net, and the automatic countercyclical role of UI is important to the macro
economy. For these reasons, the evidence of work disincentive effects from paying UI benefits

5

Solon (1985) estimated that the 1979 federal tax reform that made UI benefits taxable shortened average insured
unemployment durations by about one week.
6
Decker (1997, pp. 293–294) reported the range of published estimates to be between 0.3 and 1.5 weeks’ longer
duration of UI receipt for a 10 percentage point increase in the UI replacement rate.
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led to a search for ways to improve reemployment incentives in the system.7 A series of field
experiments was conducted to evaluate positive reemployment incentives in UI. Between 1984
and 1989, four reemployment bonus experiments targeted at UI recipients were conducted in the
United States. These experiments provided various levels of lump-sum payments to UI
recipients who took new, full-time jobs within 6 to 12 weeks of their benefit application and held
those jobs for at least three to four months. The purpose of these interventions was to learn more
about the behavioral response of UI recipients to changes in the UI program. Experiments that
offered reemployment bonuses were designed to find an incentive that would speed the return to
work in a manner that would benefit employees, employers, and the government, and would be
cost effective. UI claimants would be better off if they returned to work sooner and found jobs
that were similar and paid similar wages to the jobs that they would take in the absence of a
bonus offer. Employers would be better off if they had lower UI payroll taxes. The government
would be better off if the cost of the bonus were offset by a decrease in UI benefit payments to
unemployed workers and an increase in income and other tax contributions by workers during
their longer period of employment.

Illinois UI Incentive Experiment

The first bonus experiment was conducted in Illinois during 1984–1985 and was
sponsored by the Illinois Department of Employment Security. Its goal was to examine the
theoretical and empirical economic implications of a reemployment bonus offer to UI claimants
and the potential for developing a cost-effective bonus program. The Illinois design provided a

7

Oaxaca and Taylor (1986) estimate the macro stabilizing effects of UI on local economies.
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$500 bonus amount, equivalent to about four weeks of UI benefit payments—i.e., four times the
UI weekly benefit amount (WBA). To collect a bonus payment, treatment group members
needed to become reemployed within 11 weeks of filing their UI claims (Table 1 summarizes the
design and impact estimates for the reemployment bonus experiments).

The estimated impact of the Illinois reemployment bonus offer to UI claimants was a
reduction in the duration of UI-compensated unemployment by 1.15 weeks (Woodbury and
Spiegelman 1987). This reduction was so great that the reemployment bonus was cost-effective
to the UI Trust Fund, generating a benefit-cost ratio of 2.32. At the same time, participants
suffered no reduction in postunemployment wages, which indicates that the bonus offer did not
reduce job quality.

New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment

Independent of the Illinois experiment, the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL)
sponsored a New Jersey UI experiment that included a reemployment bonus treatment group.
This project was designed and became operational in 1985 and 1986, before the results from the
Illinois experiment became available. As such, the New Jersey experiment was not designed to
replicate or validate the Illinois experiment. The New Jersey bonus offer was designed so that
the amount of the offer was tied to a claimant’s remaining UI benefit entitlement. Thus, the
amount paid was larger in cases of more rapid reemployment. The initial bonus offer was onehalf of the claimant’s remaining entitlement at the time of the offer. This offer amount remained
constant for the first two full weeks after the initial offer. Thereafter, the amount of the bonus
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offer declined by 10 percent of the original amount per week, falling to zero by the end of the
eleventh full week of the bonus offer. Initial bonus offers in New Jersey averaged $1,644, which
was about nine times the UI weekly benefit amount.

The evaluation of the New Jersey experiment suggested that the reemployment bonus, as
it was implemented in New Jersey, generated modest savings in UI. Since the cost of offering
and paying the bonuses exceeded the modest UI savings, the New Jersey bonus was not cost
effective from the perspective of the UI system.

Pennsylvania and Washington Reemployment Bonus Experiments

In 1987, with the evaluation of the Illinois experiment completed and the New Jersey
experiment operations over, USDOL sponsored two additional reemployment bonus
experiments. In contrast to the Illinois experiment, these later trials generated much more
modest results. In the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments, the bonus offers were set as
multiples of the worker’s weekly benefit level. This design was adopted because in the Illinois
experiment, claimants receiving less than the UI maximum weekly benefit responded more
strongly to bonus offers than those constrained by the maximum (O’Leary, Spiegelman, and
Kline 1995). The Pennsylvania and Washington experiments tested benefit levels that bracketed
the Illinois bonus amount (4 ×WBA) and tested qualifications both similar to the earlier offers
and about half as great.
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The resulting designs provided for four treatment groups in Pennsylvania and six in
Washington (Table 1). Each treatment specified a bonus level (high and low in Pennsylvania;
high, medium, and low in Washington) and a qualification period or duration of the bonus offer
(short and long in both states). The reemployment period of four months was the same for all
treatments. While half of the 10 treatments in Pennsylvania and Washington were cost effective
to claimants, society, and the government sector as a whole, only two of the treatments were cost
effective for the UI system (Decker and O’Leary 1995).

The relatively weak response to the bonus offers in Pennsylvania and Washington led to a
reexamination of the powerful Illinois results. It was discovered that within the designed
experiment, a second experiment had unintentionally taken place. In 1984, as Illinois was
recovering from a major recession, the availability of Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC)
was terminated. This resulted in about half of the claimants studied having 38 weeks of UI
benefit eligibility, with the remainder being eligible for only 26 weeks of regular UI benefits. It
turns out that the mean bonus response of −1.15 weeks in Illinois was made up of a response of
−1.78 weeks for those eligible for FSC and −0.54 weeks for those not eligible (Davidson and
Woodbury 1991). The mean response of −0.54 for the non-FSC sample in Illinois is close to the
response observed in Pennsylvania and Washington, where the entitled duration of benefits was
also similar.

Among the individual treatments, the impact on weeks of UI benefits ranged from −0.05
for the offer in Washington involving a low bonus amount and a short qualification period to
−1.78 for the bonus offer to FSC-eligible claimants in Illinois. Impacts for Pennsylvania tended
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to fall between those for Illinois and Washington. Overall, a cash bonus can be expected to
modestly shorten spells of insured unemployment—the mean effect of the offers made in the
three states yielded about a one-half week’s reduction in UI benefits.

The degree of response to the bonus offer was also examined for important subgroups
within the sample. Results from Pennsylvania and Washington suggest that UI claimants in low
unemployment areas and claimants whose prior employment was in manufacturing tended to
respond more strongly to the bonus. However, close inspection of subgroup results reveals one
overarching finding: there is no difference between any pair of subgroups shown that is both
statistically significant at conventional confidence levels and consistent across the three
experiments. The implication of this finding is quite striking—the reemployment bonus has a
remarkably even impact on various subgroups of workers, whether delineated by gender, age,
race, industrial sector of employment, level of local unemployment, or level of the weekly
benefit amount.

Pennsylvania and Washington Targeted Reemployment Bonuses

O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (2005) investigated whether targeting reemployment
bonus offers to unemployment insurance (UI) claimants identified as most likely to exhaust
benefits would reduce benefit payments.8 They showed that targeting bonus offers with profiling

8

Targeted reemployment bonuses were also tested in a field experiment (Wandner 2012) as part of personal
reemployment accounts (PRAs). However, the design of the bonus offers under PRAs was not similar to the earlier
experiments, and the bonus take-up was low among UI beneficiaries who accepted a PRA offer. Furthermore,
across the seven states where targeted PRAs were tried, only 45 percent of PRA money was paid out in
reemployment bonuses. A larger share of PRA money was paid for supportive services (Kirby et al. 2008).
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models similar to those in state Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) systems
can improve cost effectiveness.9 However, estimated average benefit payments do not steadily
decline as the eligibility screen for targeting is gradually tightened by the probability of UI
exhaustion. They find that narrow targeting is not optimal. The best candidate to emerge is a
low bonus amount with a long qualification period, targeted to the half of profiled claimants
most likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement.

Two potential behavioral effects might reduce cost effectiveness for an operational
program (Meyer 1995). First, an actual bonus program could have a displacement effect.
Displacement occurs if UI claimants who are offered a bonus increase their rate of reemployment
at the expense of other job seekers not offered a bonus. Second, there is also the risk that an
operational bonus offer program could induce an entry effect. That is, the availability of a
reemployment bonus might result in a larger proportion of unemployed job seekers entering the
UI system.

If entry and displacement effects are sizable, actual program cost effectiveness will be
lowered. However, targeting offers of a low bonus amount coupled with a long qualification
period to only those most likely to exhaust UI should reduce both these risks. Targeting would
introduce uncertainty that a bonus offer would be forthcoming upon filing a UI claim, which
should reduce the chance of a large entry effect. Also, targeting should reduce any potential for
displacement, since a smaller proportion of claimants would receive the bonus offer.10

9

More on WPRS is provided below in the section on targeted job search assistance.
Davidson and Woodbury (1993) estimate that a nontargeted bonus offer to all UI claimants could increase
unemployment durations among those not eligible for UI by between 0.2 and 0.4 weeks.
10
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The UI Work Test and Job Search Assistance
Unemployment insurance provides temporary partial wage replacement to the
involuntarily unemployed. Proper administration of this principle assures that UI is social
insurance and not a dole. Unemployment insurance eligibility rules require that beneficiaries are
strongly attached to the labor force and temporarily jobless through no fault of their own. To
initially qualify for UI, a claimant must satisfy both monetary and nonmonetary eligibility
requirements. Monetary eligibility for UI is determined by base period earnings. 11 The
nonmonetary eligibility rules specify that the job separation must be involuntary. These rules
prohibit quits and discharge for causes justifiable by an employer, such as frequent tardiness,
unexplained absences, misconduct, or poor job performance. To maintain continuing UI
eligibility, beneficiaries also must be able, available, and actively seeking full-time work.
Assessment of compliance with the UI work test is normally administered by the Employment
Service (ES), which works in cooperation with state UI agencies. An influential audit of UI
payment accuracy done for the U.S. Department of Labor reported that a large fraction of
overpayments in the UI system were due to failure to satisfy work search requirements (Burgess
and Kingston 1987). This influential study spawned a series of evaluations of the UI work test
and associated job search requirements.

The UI work test normally involves beneficiaries certifying on their biweekly continued
claim form that they have actively searched for work. Most states require beneficiaries to name
two or three specific employers contacted about work in the past two weeks. Job search

11

The UI base period is normally the first four of the previous five completed calendar quarters before the date of
claim for benefits. For claimants not eligible based on earnings in the standard base period, earnings in an alternate
base year (ABY)—the four most recently completed calendar quarters—are considered for monetary eligibility in 41
states.
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assistance (JSA) comprises a bundle of services available from the public labor exchange, which
may include resume preparation assistance, job finding clubs, provision of specific labor market
information, development of a job search plan, and orientation to self-service resources (job
vacancy listings, resume preparation, word processor competency testing, and telephones for
contacting employers). In the evaluations of JSA that have been done, job search workshops are
treated as a distinct service. Evaluations of the UI work test and JSA overlap.

Four specific evaluations of JSA have been particularly influential in shaping public labor
exchange policy. The designs, samples, and findings from these studies are given in Table 2.
All evaluations were done as field experiments involving random assignment. Among other
offerings of the public employment service, job referrals and placements have not applied an
experimental design because of the untenable design requirement of withholding from the
control group basic services having universal entitlement. Consequently, JSA evaluations have
focused on UI claimants and have usually involved providing additional services.

It is well documented that in performing its income replacement function, UI acts as a
disincentive to rapid return to work (Decker 1997). The work test that links the UI and ES
programs in the United States is an institutional mechanism for monitoring whether UI
beneficiaries are available and actively seeking work. The JSA evaluations have investigated
various approaches to improving the effectiveness of the work test for UI.
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Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test Experiment

The first field experiment addressing aspects of the UI work test in the United States
began enrollment in February 1983 in Charleston, South Carolina (Corson, Long, and Nicholson
1985). Random assignment of 5,675 initial UI claimants to three treatment groups and a control
group was completed in December 1983. The experiment was designed to evaluate new
procedures intended to improve the UI work test and enhance ES practices. The three treatments
tested represented successively larger bundles of services. This design permitted researchers to
draw contrasts between the three treatment groups themselves as well as between the treatment
groups and the single control group.

Claimants assigned to the control group were given the customary work test, which
involved informing claimants that ES registration was required but involved no systematic
monitoring of this requirement. The three treatments in Charleston were as follows:

1.

A strengthened work test, requiring that an ES registration notice be sent after the

first UI benefit check was paid. Payment of the second check would be suspended for failure to
register with the ES. This measure required establishment of improved data-sharing systems
between UI and ES.
2.

A strengthened work test, plus enhanced placement services, including a personal

placement interview within one week of the first UI check, a job referral or an outreach attempt
to contact a prospective employer (job development), and training in using the job vacancy
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listings. Treatment-assigned claimants were also told they would be called for special services
again once they drew nine weeks of benefits.
3.

A strengthened work test, enhanced placement services, plus job search

workshops that included a three-hour workshop and, after four weeks of UI benefits, a workshop
on labor market information.

The strengthened work test had the greatest impact. It alone shortened the duration of
compensated joblessness by more than half a week; the impact estimate was −0.55 weeks of UI
benefits. This effect was statistically significant, but not significantly different from the
estimated effect of the second treatment. The addition of enhanced placement services resulted
in an impact estimate of −0.61 weeks, or an insignificant increase over the strengthened work
test alone. The impact estimate for the third treatment, which added job search workshops, was
−0.76 weeks of UI benefits, a modest incremental effect over either of the other treatments.

Impacts of the treatments were concentrated among men who averaged impacts of greater
than −1.0 weeks for all treatments, and among workers in the construction industry, who had
impacts of over −4.0 weeks. The relatively low cost of treatments resulted in jaw-dropping
benefit-cost ratios in excess of 4. That is, more than four dollars in UI benefit payments were
saved for every dollar spent on the work test, JSA, and job search workshop services. The third
treatment, which involved the largest number of components, had an average cost of only $17.58
in 1983 dollars.
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In 1969, the UI trust fund was added to the federal unified budget. Conservation of UI
funds consequently improved the overall budget picture. In the 1980s political environment of
huge federal deficits, the Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test Experiment drew
attention to the strengthened work test, JSA, and job search workshops as appealing policy tools.
These instruments offered the potential of providing positive services while conserving UI trust
fund dollars.

Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment

Effects of the UI work test and related services of the public labor exchange were further
investigated by a field experiment with random assignment between July 1986 and August 1987
in Tacoma, Washington, job service centers. A total of 6,763 UI claimants were assigned to one
of three treatments, and 2,871 claimants were assigned to the control group, which followed the
existing Washington state work search policy.

The standard work search rule required three employer contacts per week plus an
eligibility review interview 13 to 15 weeks after the initial claim was filed. This eligibility
review interview involved a one-hour group session followed by a 15-minute individual
interview. The focus of both sessions was on UI eligibility. The three treatments in Tacoma
were as follows:

1.

Exception reporting—elimination of the UI work test. Claimants were not
required to file the standard biweekly continued UI claim form, and they were
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told that UI payments would continue until the claimant voluntarily reported a
change in employment circumstances, such as return to work or an increased level
of earnings.
2.

New work search policy—individualized work search requirements, including a
group eligibility review interview followed by an intensive one-on-one follow-up
interview.

3.

Intensive services—individualized work search requirements (Treatment 2), plus
a two-day job search workshop after four weeks (two days of classroom
instruction plus 10 hours of phone canvassing), plus a group eligibility review
interview after 12 weeks with a focus on employability development, plus
individual follow-up.

Suspension of enrollment into the first treatment was done earlier than planned because
the larger-than-expected response could easily be detected with a sample much smaller than
designed. Claimants relieved of the work test and continued claim filing were estimated to have
increased their receipt of UI benefits by 3.34 weeks—a statistically significant effect. This
impact was bigger for women with children and men without children, and for married women
and unmarried men.

The new work search policy, which provided custom-tailored services and schedules, had
the effect on UI benefit receipt of adding 0.17 weeks and was statistically indistinguishable from
the existing standard work-search rule, which is applied uniformly to all claimants.
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Treatment 3, which was customized and had a job search workshop after four weeks and
an eligibility review interview after 12 weeks, had a statistically significant impact of −0.47
weeks. Impacts were bigger for women without children and unmarried women. An analysis of
the timing of the components of this treatment and claimant response (at 4 and 12 weeks) was
combined with analysis of the timing of the standard treatment given the control group (at 13 to
15 weeks) and response to that analysis. This combination provided new insight into claimant
behavior. In both cases, it was more likely for beneficiaries to stop UI receipt before a scheduled
intervention, rather than after the service was provided. Such a response might be termed an
“invitation effect.”

This led to the conclusion that the timed elements of the work test—job search workshop
and eligibility review interview—acted more like a stick prodding return to work than a carrot
providing a reward for achieving that end. The researchers speculated that the response to
Treatment 2 had no identifiable peaks in the timing of exit from UI receipt because the
individually customized schedule attenuated the observed response to an invitation to have an
eligibility review interview.

Needless to say, exception reporting was estimated to be very costly. Individualized
requirements generated no differential impact. An invitation to attend either an eligibility review
interview or a job search workshop shortens duration, with the latter having a bigger effect. Exit
rates are lower during and after the eligibility review interview and job search workshop,
suggesting it is the requirement to attend rather than the value of the session that shortens
duration.

20

Lachowska, Meral, and Woodbury (2015) recently examined long-term evidence from
the Tacoma experiment by merging Washington UI program administrative data from nine
additional years after the original one-year follow-up period. They focused on the treatment that
removed the work test, and they estimated that nearly all the costs were borne by the UI system
in the year of the experimental program change. Long-term effects averaged out to zero, but
subgroup analysis by job separation reason yielded an important result for those permanently
separated from jobs. For this group, the 10-year follow-up suggested that the standard UI work
search requirement yielded significantly faster reemployment and greater long-term employment
stability. Those excused from the work test got reemployed about 1.40 calendar quarters later
and had job tenure of about 1.65 quarters shorter than the comparison group.

Maryland UI Work Search Experiment

Enrollment into the Maryland UI work search experiment was conducted in six public
labor-exchange offices around the state throughout the calendar year of 1994 (Klepinger et al.
1998). A combined sample of 23,758 new monetarily eligible UI claimants were enrolled into
the experiment.

The standard work search policy was given to the control group. This requires two jobsearch contacts per week, which must be reported on the biweekly UI continued claim form but
are not verified. The four alternative treatments tested were these:
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1.

Report four weekly employer contacts, which are not verified.

2.

Contact two employers per week, but claimants need not report the two contacted.

3.

Report two weekly employer contacts, which are not verified, plus attend a fourday job search workshop early in the unemployment spell.

4.

Report two weekly employer contacts, plus claimants are told contacts would be
verified.

Requiring four employer contacts per week yielded a statistically significant impact of
−0.7 weeks of UI benefits. This reduction in duration resulted even in the absence of any
verification of the offers. Requiring two employer contacts per week but removing the
requirement to report the two contacts resulted in a statistically significant increase in UI benefit
durations of 0.4 weeks. The impact of requiring two employer contacts per week, which were
not verified, plus attendance at a four-day job search workshop early in the unemployment spell,
was −0.6 weeks of UI. As in the Tacoma experiment, this impact was due to increasing the
hassle associated with staying on UI, not to increasing claimants’ job search skills. Notably for
employers, this third treatment also reduced the probability of a claimant’s returning to his or her
previous employer.

Requiring reporting of two employer contacts, plus telling claimants that their two
contacts would be verified, shortened UI benefits by 0.9 weeks. Conducting verification at a rate
of 10 percent appeared to suffice as an adequate threat. Notably, the impact of this fourth
treatment occurred during the first spell of joblessness. Similarly, the first treatment generated
the bulk of its response during the first spell of joblessness in the benefit year. The effects of
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Treatments 1, 3, and 4 were not associated with lower reemployment earnings. However,
eliminating the work-search reporting requirement, as in Treatment 2, raises reemployment
earnings by a statistically significant 4 percent.

A second control group facing the standard work test was also tracked, but claimants
assigned to this group were told that their behavior was being tracked as part of an experiment.
This was done to permit testing for the presence of a Hawthorne effect. This is relevant in
ensuring external validity of the evaluation. If part of the treatment response to a new work test
is simply due to added attention on the work test, then such an effect could quickly dissipate after
actual implementation. Impact estimates computed as a contrast between the participant group
and each of the two control groups were virtually identical, suggesting the absence of any
Hawthorne effect.12

Connecticut, Tennessee, Massachusetts, and Virginia Benefit-Rights Interviews Experiment

Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Deschênes (2005) conducted a field experiment on work
search activity by UI claimants in four states. The control group followed the regular procedure
for UI applicants in the states of Connecticut, Tennessee, Massachusetts, and Virginia. The
procedure specified that applicants must apply in person for UI at public employment offices.
To be initially eligible, applicants must demonstrate labor force attachment by sufficient recent

12

A 1987 employment service reform in the United Kingdom called “Restart” was evaluated by Dolton and O’Neill
(1996, 2002). They found evidence that, over the short term, requiring JSA appears to act as a stick, prodding UC
beneficiaries back to work, but over the long term an earlier JSA intervention supports higher success in the labor
market and higher earnings—evidence that JSA can have valuable content for job seekers.
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earnings and show that their job separation was involuntary. Claimants also were given three
additional eligibility requirements: 1) a benefit rights interview, in which a staff member
explained the continuing work search requirements; 2) a requirement to visit the office two
weeks after UI application to learn of their initial eligibility; and 3) a requirement to report on
their active work search since application.

The experiment included two treatment groups. For both groups, the first office visit
included an enhanced benefit rights interview that involved immediate telephone verification
with the previous employer about the reason for job separation, thorough immediate checking of
prior earnings through administrative wage records or applicant-provided pay stubs, and
additional information about the requirements for continuing an active job search. During the
second office visit, the first treatment group (which received 40 percent of all treatments) had
their reported employer job search contacts validated by telephone with employers, while the
second treatment group (which received 60 percent of all treatments) did not. The second group
received only the standard continuing eligibility review that was also given to the first treatment
group and the control group during their second office visit.

There were about 1,900 experimental subjects and the same number of controls. No
treatment impacts in the individual states were statistically significant at the 95 percent
confidence level. In data pooled across the four states, the combined treatment claimant groups
showed a statistically significant 5 percent decrease in the likelihood of qualifying for benefits in
the first week. However, there were no statistically significant effects on benefit amounts or
duration, once qualified. The authors concluded that the results of this experiment failed to
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confirm the benefits of stricter continuing work-search enforcement. Nonetheless, the results
highlight the value of properly checking initial eligibility.

Michigan Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment Nudge

The high unemployment levels and long durations of UI receipt occurring in the 1975
recession led the U.S. Department of Labor to renew its emphasis on active job search by UI
beneficiaries. Guidelines for an eligibility review program were issued by USDOL to all state
employment security agencies in 1976, and beginning in 1977 states were allotted funds for
operating eligibility review programs. The eligibility review programs required states to do two
things: 1) continuously review whether UI beneficiaries had satisfied the requirements for being
able, available, and actively seeking work, and 2) actively promote reemployment of UI
beneficiaries with services. Over time, the use of eligibility review programs dwindled in many
states, along with federal funding for staff to provide services.

In 2005, USDOL renewed and expanded the concept of eligibility review programs by
providing $30 million in funding, divided among 21 states, to provide reemployment and
eligibility assessment (REA) grants. The REA program requires that UI beneficiaries must
report in person to a One-Stop Career Center for staff-assisted services, and that those
assessments must include four elements: 1) a review of continued eligibility and referral to
adjudication if a potential issue is identified, 2) the provision of labor market information, 3)
development or review of a work search plan, and 4) a referral to employment services, or to
occupational or skills training when appropriate. Nine of the 21 REA states were selected to
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participate in a quasi-experimental evaluation. In the end, only data from Minnesota were
sufficient for a reliable evaluation study. The Minnesota data suggested that the REA program
reduced the duration of UI benefit receipt by 1.2 weeks (Benus, Poe-Yamagata, et al. 2008a). A
follow-up evaluation involving random trials in Nevada provided evidence that the REA
reemployment services were effective (Michaelides et al. 2012). Funding to states for REA has
risen steadily, from $50 million in 2009 to $68.7 million in 2014.

The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research worked with Mathematica and
Ideas42 on a random assignment experiment evaluating an additional feature of REAs for
unemployment insurance (UI) beneficiaries in the four-county workforce development area
administered by Michigan Works! Southwest, a One-Stop agency affiliated with the Upjohn
Institute. The U.S. Department of Labor recently awarded Michigan funding for REA activities
in five Michigan workforce areas, including Michigan Works! Southwest, which covers the
counties of Kalamazoo, St. Joseph, Branch, and Calhoun. The core REA is a call-in program in
which continuing UI beneficiaries call in to validate that they are satisfying work-search
eligibility requirements, and so the agency can provide them with additional reemployment
services. Failure to schedule and complete an REA interview results in suspension of UI weekly
benefits.

The Michigan REA started in January 2015, and random assignment for the experiment
in the Michigan Works! Southwest counties began in March 2016. Before random assignment,
only about half of REA-assigned beneficiaries were completing REA. Randomly assigned REA
beneficiaries in southwest Michigan were given additional nudges designed on principles of
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behavioral economics (Babcock et al. 2010). The nudges took the form of a series of e-mails
providing information and reminders to participate in REA services. The nudges reminded REA
beneficiaries about three required REA appointments. A follow-up set of three “persistence”
e-mails was also sent to encourage and reinforce job search activity after the third REA visit to a
Michigan Works! office. The persistence e-mails provided links to office locations and phone
numbers, schedules of local services, and testimonials from previous service recipients.13
Interventions were delivered to the treatment sample from March to September 2015.

Part of the standard Michigan UI work test is registering online with the ES system. That
requires entering a personal e-mail address, and those addresses were linked to the weekly REA
list to operationalize the random trials. The actual sample inflow for randomization was smaller
than the expected 40 new participants per week in just Kalamazoo. Since the workforce area
also included Battle Creek, Coldwater, and St. Joseph, those areas were added to yield a total of
about 40 new REA referrals weekly by the end of the experiment. The study found that “UI
claimants who were sent email messages were more likely to start the REA program by
scheduling their first session. UI claimants who received email messages were also more likely
to complete the REA program. Once individuals attended their first REA session, they were
equally likely to complete the program regardless of whether they had received emails or not”
(Darling et al. 2016, p. 1).

Targeted Job Search Assistance

13

Only one recipient of a persistence nudge e-mail opted out of the reminder and reinforcement service.
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Targeting of JSA surfaced as a policy option during the 1990s, following the massive
economic restructuring and worker dislocation of the previous decade. Earlier research had
identified JSA as a cost-effective tool for promoting return to work. The question of whether
JSA would be effective for those at risk of long-term unemployment was evaluated in the context
of a major field experiment in New Jersey (Corson et al. 1989). Together with earlier evidence
on JSA cost effectiveness, results from the New Jersey experiment supported establishment of
the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system, which required targeted JSA
(Wandner 1994).

Two subsequent experiments have evaluated the effectiveness of targeted JSA. The first
was undertaken around the time of WPRS start-up, with special accommodations made to ensure
experimental integrity (Decker et al. 2000). The other evaluation, which involved randomization
at the margin, was done in the context of the operating WPRS program in Kentucky
(Black et al. 2003). In this section, we briefly review the design and findings of these studies. A
summary of results is given in Table 3.

New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment

Enrollment in the New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment was done between July
1986 and June 1987 (Corson et al. 1989). The sampling frame for random assignment was
calibrated to target the evaluation to dislocated workers claiming UI benefits. Characteristics
screens were set to construct the sampling frame.
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These conditions required that a claimant must do these five things: 1) receive a first UI
payment, which must occur within five weeks of applying for benefits; 2) be at least 25 years of
age; 3) have worked for the pre-UI claim employer for at least three years; 4) not be on standby
awaiting return to the claimant’s previous job with a specific recall date; and 5) not be a union
hiring hall member.

The first three of these eligibility conditions permitted the offer of an intervention early in
the jobless spell; the second two out of the these first three ensured that subjects of the
experiment were well-established labor force members separated from a long job attachment;
and the last two conditions provided the potential for interventions to affect job search plans.
Claimants who are awaiting recall to their previous job and members of union hiring halls are not
required by the UI system to engage in active job search.

Random assignment sent 2,385 claimants to the control group and 8,675 to one of three
treatment groups. All three treatments included JSA, the first consisting of JSA alone. The
second treatment added job training to JSA.14 The third treatment added a cash reemployment
bonus to JSA. The bonus was for reemployment within 11 weeks of the claim and was a cash
payment of half the remaining UI entitlement, with the initial offer good for two weeks and then
declining by 10 percent per week. The bonus was not paid if return to work was a recall, or if
the job was temporary, seasonal, part-time or with a relative. For all three treatment groups, at

14

A relocation allowance was also available in Treatment 2, but it was rarely used.
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five weeks into the claim all treatments had been given: JSA orientation, skills and aptitude
testing, JSA workshop, and an assessment or counseling interview.

During the benefit year, the weeks of UI benefit receipt declined by −0.47, −0.48, and
−0.97 for the three treatments, respectively. All of these impact estimates carried statistical
significance. The cumulative impacts on weeks of UI benefit receipt over the six years after the
initial benefit claim were −0.76, −0.93, and −1.72 for the three treatments, and the estimated
impact from the third treatment was statistically significant (Corson and Haimson 1995).

The New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment demonstrated that JSA targeted to
claimants likely to be long-term unemployed had the same cost-effective impact as that found for
other groups of UI claimants—about half a week shorter UI receipt. The encouraging results for
the bonus treatment led the U.S. Department of Labor to further investigate the ideal design for a
reemployment bonus offer (Decker and O’Leary 1995).

D.C. and Florida Job Search Assistance Experiment

The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 authorized the U.S.
Department of Labor to conduct the Job Search Assistance Experiment. The experiment was
designed to evaluate whether providing early JSA to claimants identified by statistical models as
likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement would be cost effective (Decker et al. 2000).
During the planning stages of the evaluation, which was to be run in the District of Columbia and
the state of Florida, federal legislation leap-frogged public policy analysis.

30

In 1993, President Clinton signed Public Law 103-152, which required state employment
security agencies to establish and use a system of profiling all new claimants for regular UI
benefits. The Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system was intended to
identify UI claimants who are most likely to exhaust their regular benefits, so they may be
provided early reemployment services to make a faster transition to new employment.

The WPRS established a two-stage process. First, UI recipients who are expecting recall
or who are members of a union hall are dropped. These groups are excluded because they are
not expected to undertake an active independent job search. Second, remaining UI recipients are
ranked by their likelihood of exhausting regular unemployment insurance benefits. Beneficiaries
are then referred to early reemployment services in the order of their profiling score until the
capacity of local agencies to serve them is exhausted.

The JSA experiment proceeded with enrollment in Florida between March 1995 and
March 1996 in 10 sites around the state where regular WPRS operations were temporarily
delayed. Random assignment in Florida involved 8,071 claimants. In Washington, DC, the
experiment counted as the federal district’s WPRS implementation. Random assignment
enrollment to the JSA experiment was done in all public labor exchange offices throughout the
District between June 1995 and June 1996, and involved 12,042 claimants.

The JSA experiment established an eligible pool of claimants using a two-stage process:
1) exclude job-attached and union hiring hall members, then 2) evaluate the probability of
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exhausting UI entitlement and target those with the highest probabilities for the evaluation.
These claimants were randomly assigned to the control group or one of three treatment groups.
There were three treatments:

1.

Structured job search assistance (SJSA): orientation, testing, job search workshop,

one-on-one assessment interview. Failure to participate could result in denial of UI benefits.
Two additional visits with staff to report job search progress.
2.

Individualized job search assistance (IJSA): orientation and one-on-one

assessment interview. Individual plan is developed which may include additional mandatory
services.
3.

Individualized job search assistance with training (IJSA+): identical to IJSA, plus

a coordinated effort with Economically Dislocated Worker Adjustment Act staff to enroll the
customer in training.

The impacts of the three treatments on weeks of UI compensation in the benefit year in
Washington, D.C., were −1.13, −0.47, and −0.61, respectively; all were estimated to have
statistical significance. Estimates of the same parameters in Florida were −0.41, −0.59, and
−0.52, all of which were also statistically significant. Both evaluations indicated that
reemployment occurred at wage rates similar to previous levels. The treatments had generally
positive and significant effects on earnings in Washington, DC, but no impact on participant
earnings in Florida.
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Structured JSA emerged as the most cost-effective intervention examined. The authors
of the evaluation report attributed the generally larger impacts observed in Washington, D.C., to
stricter enforcement of JSA participation requirements. They recommended making particular
JSA services mandatory and maintaining clear linkages between UI and ES in the new One-Stop
environment under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA).

Kentucky Targeted Reemployment Services

While Kentucky was included among the states studied in the national evaluation of
WPRS, an independent assessment of WPRS in Kentucky based on an experimental design
arrived at a much different conclusion. The profiling model used in Kentucky was developed by
economists at the Center for Business and Economic Research at the University of Kentucky
(Berger et al. 1997). In working with the Kentucky Department for Employment Services on the
WPRS system, they advocated a methodology for assignment to WPRS that provided ready data
for an experimental evaluation of WPRS effectiveness.

Kentucky divides the predicted UI exhaustion distribution into 20 groups spanning 5
percentile points each. Every week the local WPRS capacity is reached within one of the 20
groups. That group is referred to as a profiling tie group. In Kentucky, profiled WPRS
customers within profiling tie groups are randomly assigned either to WPRS or to a control
group. This is viewed as an appropriate rule for referral to WPRS from a group of UI claimants
having scores that are not statistically significantly different. It also provides the basis for
evaluation of WPRS based on random trials.
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From the profiling tie group, experimental and control groups were formed by the
random trials to conduct an evaluation of the WPRS in Kentucky (Black et al. 2003). Data were
collected starting with the very beginning of WPRS implementation in Kentucky—from October
1994 through June 1996. The profiling tie groups yielded a total sample of 1,981 claimants, with
1,236 of these assigned to mandatory WPRS job search assistance. Compared to the total
population of 48,002 profiled and referred Kentucky claimants in that period, the means of
observable characteristics (age, schooling, gender, race, prior earnings, weekly benefit amount)
for the experimental treatment group were not statistically significantly different from those in
the control group.

The impact estimates for WPRS in Kentucky were dramatic. On three outcomes of
interest, the estimated impacts were −2.2 weeks of UI, −$143 UI benefits, and a $1,054 increase
in earnings during the UI benefit year. The difference in these estimates from the national
WPRS evaluation were most likely due to the fact that Black et al. (2003) essentially confined
their contrasts within profiling tie groups, thereby achieving a closer counterfactual. The authors
noted that the reduced duration was mainly due to no-shows for the profiling services, but it may
be the case that these UI beneficiaries simply returned to work earlier. On the other hand,
Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer (2002) and Dickinson et al. (1999) compared those assigned to
WPRS who had the highest probability of benefit exhaustion against all those profiled but not
referred, including many with very low exhaustion probabilities. This meant the comparison
group in the national evaluation was likely to have shorter mean benefit durations than program
participants, even in the absence of WPRS services.
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The extraordinary foresight of the Kentucky Department of Employment Services to
include randomization in assignment to WPRS should be a model for all state and local
Employment Service delivery agencies. In setting up WPRS administrative rules, the Kentucky
agency realized the value of evaluation research and used that orientation to help resolve the
resource allocation problem. When resources are limited, randomization in program assignment
can always be viewed as an equitable mechanism. It has the added benefit of providing for
strong evaluation evidence.

Employer Incentives

Field experiments to induce hiring, job creation, self-employment, or job retention are
summarized in this section, including the Dayton wage subsidy experiment; the Illinois UI
employer incentive experiment; the Washington and Massachusetts UI self-employment
experiments; project GATE (Growing America Through Entrepreneurship) to assist
entrepreneurs in Maine, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania; and the work-sharing experiment in Iowa
and Oregon. A summary of design elements and results from these evaluations is given in
Tables 4 and 5.

In standard usage, a wage subsidy is a payment directly to an employer to partially offset
the wage costs for a newly hired employee, while a wage supplement means a payment directly
to a worker. There is much less evidence about the latter, but results pertaining to the wage
subsidy suggest a supplement may be more effective (Card and Robins 1998). The main appeal
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of the wage supplement is that it is unlikely to create the type of stigma that employers may
attribute to workers for whom they receive wage subsidies. The importance of the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) may be largely that it is paid directly to working families without any
employer knowledge.

Among the four tests of wage subsidies in the United States, two operated as government
programs run through the tax system and two worked as voucher experiments. During the late
1970s and early 1980s, the New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) and the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit
(TJTC) allowed employers to reduce tax payments by a fraction of the amount paid to workers
hired under the programs. Hamermesh and Rees (1984) report that NJTC subsidies were drawn
for one-third of all the new jobs created during the period it was in effect. However, Perloff and
Wachter (1979) estimate that the NJTC resulted in just 3 percent more jobs than would have
been created without the program. The TJTC was intended to increase employment among
certain targeted disadvantaged groups. Hollenbeck and Wilke (1991) found that the TJTC
increased labor market success of “nonwhite male youth, but is stigmatizing for eligible
individuals from other race/sex groups.” This finding that a wage subsidy acts as a stigma also
emerged from the experimental studies.

Dayton Wage Subsidy Experiment

A targeted wage subsidy was operated as a field experiment with random trials in 1980–
1981 by the U.S. Department of Labor in Dayton, Ohio. The evaluation involved two
treatments: 1) a hiring tax credit (with 247 in the sample) and 2) a lump-sum cash subsidy
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payment (299 in the sample), plus a control group (sample size of 262) of otherwise similar
employers. Burtless (1985, p. 106) writes that “the results show conclusively that workers
known to be eligible for targeted wage subsidies were significantly less likely to find jobs than
were otherwise identical workers whose eligibility for subsidies was not advertised.” Burtless
(1985, p. 105) speculates that “the vouchers had a stigmatizing effect and provided a screening
device with which employers discriminated against economically disadvantaged workers.”

Illinois UI Hiring Incentive Experiment

Another experiment testing an intervention that amounted to a wage subsidy was not
restricted to economically disadvantaged workers but may have also stigmatized job seekers.
Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) report that for the Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiment,
cash bonuses paid directly to persons who gain reemployment have a powerful effect in reducing
the duration of unemployment, while if a cash payment for hiring a job seeker is made to
employers, the effect is almost nil. Employers may be reluctant to hire workers who present a
voucher for payment from the state because it signals that the workers may have “hidden”
characteristics that hinder their finding employment without a state subsidy.

Most programs for the unemployed are either income-support or labor-supply enhancing;
the wage subsidy is a labor-demand stimulus. But apparently regardless of the form of delivery
of the subsidy to employers, it has a stigmatizing effect on workers. An obvious alternative is
the wage supplement, which is paid directly to workers. This type of program has even been
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recommended to help welfare recipients (who might face the most severe stigma) gain
reemployment.15

Washington and Massachusetts UI Self-Employment Experiments

Self-employment initiatives for unemployed persons have been operating in Europe since
1979.16 Seventeen countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) have programs patterned after either the French model, which grants a
lump sum to the unemployed who plan to become self-employed, or the British model, which
gives a series of periodic support payments during the start-up phase of self-employment.17 The
British model amounts to a waiver of the work search requirements for continued receipt of
periodic unemployment compensation payments. American experiments tested the French
model in Washington State and the British model in Massachusetts (Benus et al. 1995).

Self-employment assistance in Massachusetts was assessed by randomized controlled
trials between 1990 and 1993. The treatment group increased self-employment, reduced the
length of their unemployment, and increased their total time in employment—including selfemployment plus wage and salary employment. The experiment also had a substantial positive
impact on participants’ earnings. In a benefit-cost framework, self-employment assistance was
estimated to be cost effective for project participants, society as a whole, and the government

15

See for example Lerman (1985).
Background information on the European experience with and the American experiments in self-employment for
unemployed persons can be found in Wandner (1994).
17
The French model is followed in Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden, while the British model is
used in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany.
16
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sector as well. Overall, the self-employment assistance provided in the demonstration
significantly increased participants’ total time in employment (i.e., the combination of selfemployment and wage and salary employment) after being randomly assigned to the project.
Including time spent in self-employment and wage and salary employment, participants were
employed 1.9 months longer than the control group. Total earnings of the average project
participant increased by $5,940 over the amount earned by the average control-group member
over the three-year follow-up period.

The Washington UI Self-Employment Demonstration (SEED) involved randomassignment enrollment to treatment and control groups in Washington State between September
1989 and September 1990, with business services available for participants through March 1991
(Benus et al. 1995). A total of 755 new claimants were enrolled in SEED at the six sites and were
offered demonstration services; 752 new claimants who applied to SEED were assigned to the
control group. The SEED treatment followed the French-style lump-sum payment method, with
the offer being the remainder of a UI beneficiary’s entitlement at the start of self-employment
efforts along with business start-up and development efforts. The first Washington telephone
survey was conducted, on average, 21 months after random assignment.

Only about 4 percent of targeted Washington UI claimants met the initial eligibility
requirements of attending an orientation and submitting an application. Compared to the control
group, treatments achieved the following 10 things: 1) spent about 4.0 months more in
self-employment; 2) earned more than control subjects from self-employment during the followup period; 3) had reduced likelihood of wage and salary employment; 4) spent about one month
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less in wage and salary employment; 5) earned significantly less from wage and salary
employment; 6) had similar earnings from wage and salary and self-employment during the
observation period; 7) had higher rates of employment; 8) reduced the length of the first
unemployment spell; 9) excluding the lump-sum payment, had reduced UI benefit receipt during
the first benefit year; 10) including the lump-sum payment, had higher total UI payments during
the first benefit year.

Maine, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania Entrepreneurship Experiment

Growing America Through Entrepreneurship (GATE) studied the value of helping new
entrepreneurs start and expand their own small businesses (Benus, McConnell, et al. 2008).
Enrollment was done in state employment offices or kiosks between Fall 2003 and Summer 2005
in seven sites in Maine, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania. In the end, only data from Minnesota was
sufficient for analysis. GATE offered three services: 1) individual assessment session; 2)
training in general business, in legal and personnel issues, and in business accounting computer
software; and 3) individual meetings with business counselors about business plans and loan
applications. A total of 4,198 Minnesota GATE applicants were randomly assigned to either the
treatment or the control group. The response rate to the follow-up survey was 82 percent at 18
months after enrollment. Survey data were merged with administrative records on UI payments
and quarterly wage records covering the 12 months before and after random assignment.

Project GATE generated a small but significant impact on business ownership in the 18month follow-up. By the third quarter after random assignment, 43 percent of the program group
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reported owning a business, a statistically significant 6 percentage points more than the
comparison group. The advantage for participants dwindled to 3 percentage points (statistically
significant at the 0.10 level) at the 18-month follow-up. There were no significant effects on
total employment with rates (self-employment plus wage and salary employment) at about 70
percent in the first quarter after random assignment and 85 percent eighteen months after random
assignment. However, compared to the control group, GATE participants were more likely to be
self-employed and less likely to be employed in wage and salary jobs.

Control-group members earned slightly more than participants from wage and salary
jobs, and about the same through self-employment, so that GATE participants earned somewhat
less during the 18-month follow-up. The wage and salary difference was $1,800 based on the
survey, but only $200 less based on UI quarterly wage records (not statistically significant).
Both groups earned about $6,000 over the 18-month follow-up period. GATE increased receipt
of UI benefits by about one week, or about $340 per person for all participants, and by about
$605 for those already receiving UI benefits when they applied to GATE. There were no
program impacts on the receipt of public assistance or other income.

Overall, results from the GATE study suggest the following things:
•

Self-employment services can be effectively offered at One-Stop Career Centers.

•

Increased business ownership might not lead to increased self-employment earnings
in the short run.

•

Self-employment can lead to a loss of earnings from wage and salary jobs in the short
run.
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•

Self-employment programs improve outcomes for UI recipients more than others.

Iowa and Oregon Work-Sharing Experiments

Short-time compensation (STC), commonly known as work sharing, is one of the very
few public employment policies to directly support labor demand.18 Under STC, work
reductions are shared among employees by reducing work hours instead of laying off some
workers. The STC program partially replaces lost earnings by paying a percentage of the entitled
UI weekly benefit amount equal to the percentage reduction in weekly work hours. Currently,
28 states have STC plans, and in those states STC is used relatively infrequently compared to
regular UI (Balducchi 2015). The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 had
features promoting STC in the states, including temporary reimbursement by the federal
government to states of STC benefits paid for three years (PL 112-96, Title III, Subtitle D). If
STC were available in all states, in recession periods it could be used as a channel of fiscal
policy by supplementing emergency federal extended unemployment benefits. A field
experiment started in 2014 aimed to identify effective strategies to promote broader employer
use of STC.

The experiment involved randomized controlled trials in Iowa and Oregon designed to
increase employer awareness and adoption of STC in lieu of temporary layoffs, and thereby
reduce regular UI claims and weeks of UI compensation. The evaluation sought to answer
research questions about 1) program awareness and interest, 2) program use, 3) costs, and 4)

18

This summary is adapted from the evaluation design report (Houseman et al. 2017).
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other lessons. The federal reimbursement feature was part of the Iowa treatments, but not the
Oregon treatments. However, because the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act
required that benefit charges from STC and regular UI be treated the same, the new law affected
the UI tax treatment of many Oregon employers with prior STC experience.

Before the experiment began, the only posted STC program information generally
available to Iowa employers was one brief section in the UI employer handbook. The researchers
worked with Iowa state officials to create a webpage and to develop informational materials,
including a brochure, fact sheet, and list of frequently asked questions about STC. Stratified
random assignment to treatment and control groups was done for Iowa employers with more than
five employees. Sampling strata were defined by employment size, UI claims history, industry,
and location. Treatment-group employers were given program information and directed to the
program staff and website by a series of postal mailings. The Iowa interventions were delivered
over 12 months starting September 2014 and involved two mass mailings to all treatments in
September 2014 and May 2015, an insert with the annual tax rate notice that is mailed out in
November, and quarterly mailings to treatment employers who had UI claims against them in the
previous calendar quarter.19 The offer of federal reimbursement for STC benefits was available
up until February 22, 2015. When the experiment started in September 2014, only 14 STC plans
were operating in Iowa.

Before the experiment, Oregon had relatively well-developed materials on STC, but had
not systematically advertised the program to employers. As with Iowa, the researchers worked

19

There was an error in the tax rate notice STC insert that contaminated about 20 percent of the control group and
delayed the mailing by two months to 80 percent of the treatment group.
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with the state to improve and update these informational materials. In the Portland metropolitan
area, an RCT design similar to that in Iowa was implemented, and a quasi-experimental design
evaluation was implemented in the balance of the state.20 During the design phase for the
experiment, USDOL set up a technical work group of advisers for the study, including social
scientists and state and federal practitioners. One recommendation from the technical work
group to increase employer usage of STC was not amenable to an RCT evaluation: the work
group recommended a cultural change to saturate the environment with information about STC
on mass media and public announcements made through political channels, business and
community organizations, and employee groups.

In the Portland metropolitan area, as in Iowa, the researchers constructed a stratified
sample of all employers and randomly assigned them to treatment and control groups. It was
judged that the Portland metro area had enough users of UI and STC that the sample size would
be sufficient to permit estimation of statistically significant effects big enough to be of policy
interest. The Oregon Employment Department divides the state into 15 state Worksource
Regions for the purposes of delivering services. The quasi-experimental design used Worksource
Regions located outside of the Portland metro area as the basis for employer assignment: all
employers located in one set of Worksource Regions were given interventions, while all
employers located in the other set were not. These were referred to as the “treatment” region and

20

The Portland area alone has nearly as many STC-eligible employers as the whole state of Iowa. The Iowa RCT
involved about 14,000 employers in the treatment and control groups, while in Oregon the count was about 10,000
in each group.
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the “comparison” region, respectively.21 As in Iowa, the Oregon interventions were
administered for a one-year period. In Oregon, the treatment period started in late October 2014.

Use of STC by Iowa employers did not change appreciably after the interventions began,
but in regression models controlling for observable characteristics, there was a small but
significant increase in starting new STC plans by employers in the treatment group.
Furthermore, the pattern of weekly STC payments in Iowa suggests that employers tried to take
advantage of temporary federal payment of STC benefits. The informational efforts had positive
and significant effects in Oregon, and there was some evidence that employers with prior STC
experience may have started new plans in response to the information. Part of the response by
experienced STC employers may have resulted from the news that STC payments in Oregon
would affect employer UI tax rates the same as regular UI payments.

Summary and Relevance to UI Today

As social insurance, UI pays compensation to labor force members who are involuntarily
separated from their jobs while they are actively seeking work. The program embodies elements
of both private insurance and social assistance. While benefit levels are related to prior earnings,
they do not completely replace lost earnings, but pay an amount that is directly related to prior
wage levels up to a socially determined adequate weekly maximum. The elements most

21

Following Bloom (2000), the minimum detectable effect in the Oregon QED evaluation will be larger than in the
RCT evaluation by a factor approximated by the square root of [1/(1-R2A)], where, R2A is the coefficient of
determination from the regression of the QED treatment indicator on characteristics of employers in the treatment
and control samples.
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reflecting private insurance principles involve using work-search requirements to test initial and
continuing eligibility for benefits.

Research in the 1970s recognized the moral hazard risks of work disincentives resulting
from paying UI benefits and estimated the effects to be between 0.5 and 1.5 weeks for a 10
percent increase in the wage replacement rate. This work led to a series of UI-related field
experiments to identify improved administrative practices and incentives to control system costs
and improve beneficiary outcomes. The reemployment bonus experiments in the 1980s
estimated that offers would reduce UI durations by an average 0.5 week and be modestly cost
effective. Simulations based on the bonus experiments found that a bonus amount smaller than
the average, when tested and targeted to the half of UI-eligible beneficiaries who are most likely
to exhaust UI, achieved a 0.5 week reduction more cost effectively. Field experiments
estimating the effects of strengthening UI work-search requirements estimated duration
reductions between 0.5 and 1.0 week. An experiment removing the work test saw durations
jump by 3.3 weeks. The UI work test involves connecting the unemployed to job search
assistance. Experimental evaluations of targeted job search assistance estimated that durations
were shortened by between 0.5 and 2.2 weeks.

Field experiments evaluating hiring incentives offered to employers have generally not
found cost-effective policy options, mainly because of low employer take-up. However, some
smaller UI programs show promise as labor demand policies—particularly when properly
targeted. Field experiments that paid UI as self-employment assistance with a work-search
waiver during the business start-up phase, and targeted to those most likely to exhaust UI, were
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found to be cost-neutral to the UI system and often lead to second-order employment effects
though hiring. Work sharing, or short-time compensation (STC), which pays employees a
fraction of their weekly UI equal to the proportionate reduction in work hours, can help
employers control layoff costs and retain talent during business downturns. A recent field
experiment suggests employers will sometimes use STC instead of layoffs when they know how
STC works.

The federal-state UI program is now gradually rebuilding system reserves after the Great
Recession. Many states were left with billions in debt from paying regular benefits, even though
the federal government fully paid for benefit extensions at unprecedented levels. Some states are
retreating from accepted standards of UI adequacy with the expectation that the federal
government will once again intervene when an unemployment crisis emerges. The potential
duration of regular UI benefits is no longer at least 26 weeks in all states. However, after welfare
reform, all social policy is now employment policy. Making and maintaining connections to the
workforce is the only path to self-sufficiency. Policymakers are looking for improvements to the
public employment system that will be cost-neutral. The experiments reviewed in this paper
offer a menu for further improvements.

Active reemployment services and targeted assistance are ways to serve more workers
within a given UI benefits budget. Financing of services and financing of benefits have both
been hampered by the inadequate federal taxable wage base of $7,000, which has not increased
since 1982. Financing of Wagner-Peyser employment services, and in many states adequate
financing of regular UI benefits, is limited by the federal taxable wage base. In 1939, this wage
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base matched the Social Security wage base, but the two have not remained in balance over the
years: the latter has grown to $118,500, while the former has barely budged. Relying on the
recent field experiment on REAs in Nevada, the federal government is attempting to strengthen
and expand state use of UI eligibility reviews and rejuvenate UI worker profiling. We are now in
a transition phase where REA is being integrated with WPRS so that job search activation and
reemployment services are targeted to UI beneficiaries most at risk of long-term unemployment
and benefit receipt. As reviewed in this paper, elements of the REA/WPRS effort—now called
Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessments (RESEA)—have been found effective in
field experiments. The UI system has been weakened by financing challenges, but incremental
improvements have often been guided by evidence from classically designed random trials. This
approach requires an understanding of how the system works and of the incentive and
administrative structure. It also requires up-front public investment for evaluation studies.
However, the results can yield an employment security system that is a stronger part of the social
safety net for all Americans.
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Table 1 Reemployment Bonus Experiments’ Impacts on Benefit-Year Weeks of UI
(standard errors in parentheses)
Bonus amount

Illinois
Qualification period

$500

11 weeks

Impact estimate
−1.15**
(−0.27)

New Jersey
Bonus amount
Half the remaining UI entitlement,
with the initial offer good for two
weeks and then declining by 10%
per week.

Qualification period

Impact estimate

11 weeks

−0.69**
(−0.23)

Pennsylvania
Bonus amount
3 × WBA
(low)
6 × WBA
(high)
Declining

−0.65
(−0.34)
−0.44*
(−0.31)

12 weeks (long)
−0.36*
(−0.28)
−0.82**
(−0.27)
−0.33
(−0.30)

Washington
2 × WBA
−0.06
(low)
(−0.30)
4 × WBA
−0.19
(medium)
(−0.30)
6 × WBA
−0.62*
(high)
(−0.33)
* significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level.
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−0.50*
(-0.29)
−0.14
(−0.30)
−0.73**
(−0.34)

Table 2 Experiments on Job Search Assistance and the UI Work Test
Authors (year published)

Title

Design

Sample

Findings

Corson, Long, and Nicholson
(1985)

Evaluation of the Charleston
Claimant Placement and Work
Test Demonstration

T1: Stronger work test
T2: T1 plus enhanced placement
services
T3: T2 plus Job Search Workshop
(JSW)
C: Customary work test

Charleston, SC,
February to
December 1983:
T: 4,247,
C: 1,428

T1: −0.55* wks. UI
T2: −0.61** wks. UI
T3: −0.76** wks. UI
Impacts greater on men and
construction workers.

Johnson and Klepinger (1991,
1994)

Evaluation of the Impacts of
the Washington Alternative
Work Search Experiment

T1: Exception reporting
T2: New work search policy
T3: Intensive services
C: Existing work search policy

Tacoma, WA,
July 1986 to August
1987:
T: 6,763,
C: 2,871

T1: +3.34** wks. UI
T2: +0.17 wks. UI
T3: −0.47* wks. UI
Exits increased preceding required
service participation.

Klepinger et al. (1998)

Evaluation of the Maryland
Unemployment Insurance
Work Search Demonstration

T1: Report four employer
contacts weekly
T2: Two contacts required
weekly, but no reporting
T3: Report two contacts weekly
plus a four-day JSW
T4: Report two contacts weekly
and both verified
C1: Standard policy: report two
contacts weekly but not verified
C2: Standard policy, but told data
were to be used in an evaluation
study

Maryland:
Six offices,
January 1, 1994, to
December 31, 1994;
Combined sample,
23,758 monetarily
eligible new initial
UI claimants.

T1: −0.7** wks. UI
T2: +0.4* wks. UI
T3: −0.6** wks. UI
T4: −0.9** wks. UI
Impacts identical against either
control group, suggesting no
Hawthorne effect present.
Treatments 1, 3, and 4 had no
earnings impacts.
Treatment 2 raised earnings by 4**
percent.

Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and
Deschênes (2005)

Do Unemployment Insurance
Recipients Actively Seek
Work? Evidence from
Randomized Trials in Four
U.S. States

T1 & T2: 1st visit to verify
eligibility and separation
T1: 2nd visit to verify job search
C: 1st visit std. eligibility review,
2nd visit std. eligibility review

Application and
reviews in person:
T1: 760;
T2: 1,140;
C: 1,900

T1 & T2: −5% initial UI eligibility
rate.
T1: no statistically significant
effect on continuing eligibility or
duration of benefits.

NOTE: T: treatment; C: control group; JSW: job search workshop. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 3 Experiments on Targeted Job Search Assistance
Authors (year published)

Title

Design

Sample

Findings

Corson et al. (1989)

New Jersey
Unemployment
Insurance
Reemployment
Demonstration Project

T1: JSA
T2: JSA plus training or
relocation assistance
T3: JSA plus a cash bonus
C: Eligibility: first UI
payment, age, tenure,
temporary layoffs, union

New Jersey:
July 1986 to
June 1987:
T: 8,675
C: 2,385

T1: −0.47** wks. of UI
T2: −0.48** wks. of UI
T3: −0.97** wks. of UI
6-year T1: −0.76 wks. of UI
6-year T2: −0.93 wks. of UI
6-year T3: −1.72** wks. of UI

Decker et al. (2000)

Assisting
Unemployment
Insurance Claimants:
The Long-Term Impact
of the Job Search
Assistance
Demonstration

T1: Structured JSA
T2: Individualized JSA
T3: T2 plus training
C: Not on standby or a
union hiring hall member,
and predicted likely to
exhaust UI entitlement

DC and Florida:
DC: June 1995
to June 1996,
8,071 claimants.
FL: March 1995
to March 1996,
12,042
claimants.

DC T1: −1.13** wks. of UI
DC T2: −0.47** wks. of UI
DC T3: −0.61** wks. of UI

Is the Threat of
Reemployment
Services More
Effective Than the
Services Themselves?
Experimental Evidence
from the UI System

T: WPRS profiled and
referred to early JSA
reemployment services
C: Profiled and in the same
predicted UI exhaustion
cohort as T, but not
referred to JSA

Kentucky:
October 1994 to
June 1996,
T: 1,236;
C: 745.

In the benefit year

Black et al. (2003)

FL T1: −0.41** wks. of UI
FL T2: −0.59** wks. of UI
FL T3: −0.52** wks. of UI

T: −2.2 weeks of UI
T: −$143 in UI benefits
T: $1,054 in earnings

NOTE: T: experimental treatment group; P: participant group; C: experimental control group or comparison group; JSW: job search workshop.
* significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 4 Experiments on Employer Incentives
Authors (year published)

Title

Design

Sample

Findings

Burtless (1985)

Are Targeted Wage
Subsidies Harmful?
Evidence from a Wage
Voucher Experiment

T1: Hiring tax credit
T2: Hiring cash subsidy
C: No assistance
All groups drawn from
AFDC and general
assistance recipients.

Dayton, OH

T1: −7.6% employed

December 1980 to
May 1981

T2: −7.9% employed

T1: 247

Few subsidy vouchers submitted by
employers (27.1% of those employed).

T2: 299

No impact on wage rates.

C: 262
Woodbury and Spiegelman
(1987)

Bonuses to Workers
and Employers to
Reduce
Unemployment:
Random Trials in
Illinois

T: $500 paid to the
employer if hired within
11 weeks of UI claim and
continuously employed
for four months.

Illinois (22 Job
Service offices), mid1984 to early 1985
T: 3,963

T: −$164 UI for white females, no impact
on white males or blacks. Low take-up:
22.8% qualified for bonus, but employers
only converted voucher to cash for 2.8%
of treatment assigned.

C: 4,186
C: Eligible for regular UI.

Benus et al. (1995)

Self-Employment
Programs: A New
Reemployment
Strategy, Final Report
on the UI SelfEmployment
Demonstration

TW: lump-sum cash-out
of UI entitlement after
self-employment training.
TM: UI work search
waiver after completing
self-employment training.
C: UI-eligible, attended
self-employment
orientation and applied.

WA: Sept. 1989 to
March 1991
TW: 755
CW: 752
MA: May 1990 to
April 1993
TM: 614
CM: 608

NOTE: T = experimental treatment group; C = experimental control group; JSW= job search workshop.
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TW: more self-employment, less regular
employment, higher self-employment
income, lower earnings from regular
employment, net earnings gain.
TM: more self-employment, more regular
employment, higher earnings from both
regular and self-employment.
In both states, self-employment was most
successful for educated males aged 35–55.

Table 5 Effects of Self-Employment Assistance Programs
Authors (year)
Benus et al.
(1995)

Method
RA: Profiled high
exhaustion
probability

Benus et al.
(1995)

RA: Profiled high Washington state
exhaustion
inflow 1989–1990
probability
treatments: 755;
controls: 752

Benus,
RA: GATE
McConnell, et al. participants got 13
(2008)
hours more SE
training than
comparison group.

Sample
Massachusetts inflow
1990–1993
treatments: 614;
controls: 608

Inflow at One-Stop
centers: 2003 to 2005;
Seven sites:
Pennsylvania (2),
Minnesota (2),
Maine (3)

Intervention
British-style SEA:
weekly UI pay with
work search waiver

Self-employed
at 19, 31 mos.,
+11%, +5%

Any employment
at 19, 31 mos.,
+1%, −4%

EI/UI receipt
−1.8 wks.

French-style SEA:
lump-sum balance of
UI entitlement

at 21, 33 mos.,
+16%, +12%

at 21, 33 mos.,
−9%, −8%

−7.6 wks.

Assessment, classroom At 3 qtrs., +6%;
training, 1-on-1
at 6 qtrs., +3%
business counseling,
help with loan
applications
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No statistically
+1 wk., +2 wks. if
significant effects, on UI first
but more employed
in SE than in wage
and salary work.

